Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching

@article{Atay2022LimitedFI,
  title={Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching},
  author={Ata Atay and Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2022},
  volume={abs/2212.07427},
  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:254685503}
}
It is shown that, once agents are sufficiently farsighted, the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm becomes stable: a singleton set consisting of the TTC matching is a horizon- k vNM stable set if the degree of fARSightedness is greater than three times the number of agents in the largest cycle of the HTC.
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31 References

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