• Publications
  • Influence
School Choice with Consent
An increasingly popular practice for student assignment to public schools in the United States is the use of school choice systems. The celebrated Gale. Shapley student-optimal stable mechanismExpand
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Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis
Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces have transitionedExpand
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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignmentsExpand
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On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
  • Onur Kesten
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • 1 March 2006
We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities overExpand
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A theory of school‐choice lotteries
A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairnessExpand
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On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
Many school districts in the US. employ centralized clearing houses to assign students to public schools. An important potential threat against any school choice mechanism is the tendency of schoolsExpand
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Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study
TLDR
We evaluate the sequential (immediate acceptance, IA), parallel (PA), and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms in the laboratory. Expand
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Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: Theory and Experiments
Within the last decade, many Chinese provinces have transitioned from the ‘sequential’ to the ‘parallel’ college admissions mechanisms. We show that all of the provinces that have abandoned theExpand
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Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
  • Onur Kesten
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • Int. J. Game Theory
  • 1 March 2009
TLDR
We present a simple and independent proof of a result due to Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2004) that characterizes the class of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, resource monotonicity and nonbossiness. Expand
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Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for a Real�?Life Assignment Mechanism
We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem in which agents have both social and private endowments. Popular applications include student assignment to on-campus housing, kidneyExpand
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