#### Filter Results:

- Full text PDF available (43)

#### Publication Year

1999

2016

- This year (0)
- Last 5 years (14)
- Last 10 years (27)

#### Publication Type

#### Co-author

#### Journals and Conferences

#### Key Phrases

Learn More

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe (1994; J. Econ. Theory 63: 299–325) to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures… (More)

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2009

We propose a new concept, pairwise farsighted stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairwise farsighted stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equal off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path… (More)

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition… (More)

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a… (More)

- Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2013

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We de
ne the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network speci
es the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with… (More)

- Georg Kirchsteiger, Marco Mantovani, +4 authors Francesco Guala
- 2013

Pairwise stability Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are perfectly farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation… (More)

There exist three equivalent de®nitions of perfect Nash equilibria which di ̈er in the way ``best responses against small perturbations'' are de®ned. It is shown that applying the spirit of these de®nitions to rationalizability leads to three di ̈erent re®nements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and… (More)

- Jean-Jacques HERINGS, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
- 2014

We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network outside of GK there is a sequence of farsighted improving paths of… (More)

- Georg Kirchsteiger, Marco Mantovani, +5 authors Vincent Vannetelbosch
- 2011

Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to… (More)

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2004

Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents interact in a society. The framework is general enough to analyze both non-cooperative and cooperative games. In order to remedy the shortcomings of existing solution concepts and to identify the consequences of common knowledge of rationality and… (More)