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  • Influence
Constrained school choice
TLDR
We study the preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable. Expand
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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed toExpand
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Stable matchings and preferences of couples
TLDR
We show that for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable matchings exist (Theorem 3.3). Expand
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Median Stable Matching for College Admissions
  • B. Klaus, F. Klijn
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Int. J. Game Theory
  • 28 February 2006
TLDR
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined and stable for college admissions problems. Expand
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Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matchedExpand
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Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
TLDR
In this note we introduceweak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. Expand
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The egalitarian solution for convex games: some characterizations
TLDR
The egalitarian solution for TU-games as introduced by Dutta and Ray [Dutta, B., Ray, D., 1989]. Expand
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An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
  • F. Klijn
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • Soc. Choice Welf.
  • 29 February 2000
TLDR
This paper studies envy-free allocations for economies with indivisible objects, quasi-linear utility functions, and an amount of money. Expand
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Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment
We experimentally investigate in the laboratory prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools and study how individual behavior is influencedExpand
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Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
TLDR
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Expand
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