On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

@article{Kesten2006OnTC,
  title={On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems},
  author={Onur Kesten},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  year={2006},
  volume={127},
  pages={155-171}
}
  • Onur Kesten
  • Published 2006
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities over objects (e.g., proximity of residence area). We study two well-known and competing mechanisms. The agentoptimal stable mechanism (AOSM) allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm. The top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) allots objects via Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm. We show that the… CONTINUE READING
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