Love or fear: Can punishment promote cooperation?
@article{Kroupa2014LoveOF,
title={Love or fear: Can punishment promote cooperation?},
author={Sebestian Kroupa},
journal={Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues},
year={2014},
volume={23},
url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:205826673}
}It is argued that current evidence supports punishment as an efficient means for the maintenance of cooperation, and that the gravity of proposed limitations of punishment for maintaining cooperation may have been overestimated in previous studies due to the features of experimental design.
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