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Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
- M. Nowak
- 8 December 2006
Five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation are discussed: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocities, network reciprocation, group selection, and group selection.
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
MUCH attention has been given to the Prisoners' Dilemma as a metaphor for the problems surrounding the evolution of coopera-tive behaviour1–6. This work has dealt with the relative merits of various…
Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life
- M. Nowak
- 29 September 2006
This chapter discusses games in Finite Populations, fitness Landscapes and Sequence Spaces, and the evolution of Virulence, as well as the Evolutionary Dynamics of Cancer and Language Evolution.
Antibody neutralization and escape by HIV-1
The detection of autologous Nab as early as 52 days after detection of HIV-specific antibodies is reported, indicating a new mechanism contributing to HIV-1 persistence in the face of an evolving antibody repertoire.
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
It is proposed that the emergence of indirect reciprocity was a decisive step for the evolution of human societies and the probability of knowing the ‘image’ of the recipient must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act.
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
The cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-process framework is explored and it is proposed that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous.
Presence of an inducible HIV-1 latent reservoir during highly active antiretroviral therapy.
- T. Chun, L. Stuyver, A. Fauci
- Biology, MedicineProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences…
- 25 November 1997
Highly purified CD4+ T cells from patients receiving HAART with an average treatment time of 10 months and with undetectable plasma viremia carried integrated proviral DNA and were capable of producing infectious virus upon cellular activation in vitro, suggesting persistent active virus replication in vivo.
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
A surprisingly simple rule is described that is a good approximation for all graphs that are analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k.
Habitat destruction and the extinction debt
A model is described that explains multispecies coexistence in patchy habitats and which predicts that their abundance may be fleeting, a future ecological cost of current habitat destruction.
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations
It is shown that a single cooperator using a strategy like ‘tit-for-tat’ can invade a population of defectors with a probability that corresponds to a net selective advantage.