Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
- E. Fehr, S. Gächter
- EconomicsSSRN Electronic Journal
- 1 June 1999
This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate…
Altruistic punishment in humans
- E. Fehr, S. Gächter
- BiologyNature
- 10 January 2002
It is shown experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation, and that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punished.
Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment
- U. Fischbacher, S. Gächter, E. Fehr
- Economics
- 1 June 2001
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity
- E. Fehr, S. Gächter
- EconomicsSSRN Electronic Journal
- 1 March 2000
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities…
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
- Benedikt Herrmann, C. Thöni, S. Gächter
- SociologyScience
- 7 March 2008
The results show that punishment opportunities are socially beneficial only if complemented by strong social norms of cooperation, and that weak norms of civic cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a country are significant predictors of antisocial punishment.
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments
- U. Fischbacher, S. Gächter
- EconomicsSSRN Electronic Journal
- 1 December 2008
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual…
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
- E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher, S. Gächter
- EconomicsHuman Nature
- 1 March 2002
Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory), however, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.
Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence
- G. Kirchsteiger, E. Fehr, S. Gächter
- Economics
- 1 July 1997
Numerous experimental studies indicate that people tend to reciprocate favors and punish unfair behavior. It is hypothesized that these behavioral responses contribute to the enforcement of contracts…
Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-economic background: survey and experimental evidence
- S. Gächter, Benedikt Herrmann, C. Thöni
- Economics
- 1 December 2004
Behavioral Game Theory
- S. Gächter
- PsychologyEncyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological…
- 14 January 2008
Game theory is a mathematical tool to describe and analyze situations of conflict, cooperation, and coordination. In rational player models it is typically assumed that players are highly rational…
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