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Adversary (cryptography)
Known as:
Adversary
In cryptography, an adversary (rarely opponent, enemy) is a malicious entity whose aim is to prevent the users of the cryptosystem from achieving…
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Related topics
Related topics
31 relations
Alice and Bob
Authentication
Block cipher
CHAOS
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Papers overview
Semantic Scholar uses AI to extract papers important to this topic.
Highly Cited
2015
Highly Cited
2015
Understanding Adversarial Training: Increasing Local Stability of Neural Nets through Robust Optimization
Uri Shaham
,
Yutaro Yamada
,
S. Negahban
arXiv.org
2015
Corpus ID: 14519548
We propose a general framework for increasing local stability of Artificial Neural Nets (ANNs) using Robust Optimization (RO). We…
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Highly Cited
2009
Highly Cited
2009
A secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment
Yi-Pin Liao
,
Shuenn-Shyang Wang
Comput. Stand. Interfaces
2009
Corpus ID: 6346430
Highly Cited
2009
Highly Cited
2009
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model
J. Alwen
,
Y. Dodis
,
Daniel Wichs
Annual International Cryptology Conference
2009
Corpus ID: 9812538
We study the design of cryptographic primitives resilient to key-leakage attacks, where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively…
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Highly Cited
2009
Highly Cited
2009
Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience
Jonathan Katz
,
V. Vaikuntanathan
International Conference on the Theory and…
2009
Corpus ID: 6832732
A leakage-resilient cryptosystem remains secure even if arbitrary, but bounded, information about the secret key (and possibly…
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Highly Cited
2007
Highly Cited
2007
A randomized, efficient, and distributed protocol for the detection of node replication attacks in wireless sensor networks
M. Conti
,
R. D. Pietro
,
L. Mancini
,
Alessandro Mei
ACM Interational Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc…
2007
Corpus ID: 5700265
Wireless sensor networks are often deployed in hostile environments, where anadversary can physically capture some of the nodes…
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Highly Cited
2005
Highly Cited
2005
Protecting Location Privacy Through Path Confusion
Baik Hoh
,
M. Gruteser
Security and Privacy in Communication Networks
2005
Corpus ID: 6320842
We present a path perturbation algorithm which can maximize users’ location privacy given a quality of service constraint. This…
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Highly Cited
2004
Highly Cited
2004
Source-location privacy in energy-constrained sensor network routing
Celal Öztürk
,
Yanyong Zhang
,
W. Trappe
ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor…
2004
Corpus ID: 1738277
As sensor-driven applications become increasingly integrated into our lives, issues related to sensor privacy will become…
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Highly Cited
2000
Highly Cited
2000
Publius: a robust, tamper-evident, censorship-resistant web publishing system
M. Waldman
,
A. Rubin
,
L. Cranor
2000
Corpus ID: 3232177
We describe a system that we have designed and implemented for publishing content on the web. Our publishing scheme has the…
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Highly Cited
1994
Highly Cited
1994
A Secure and Efficient Conference Key Distribution System (Extended Abstract)
M. Burmester
,
Y. Desmedt
International Conference on the Theory and…
1994
Corpus ID: 10144321
We present practical conference key distribution systems based on public keys, which authenticate the users and which are ‘proven…
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Highly Cited
1990
Highly Cited
1990
Competitive randomized algorithms for non-uniform problems
Anna R. Karlin
,
M. Manasse
,
L. McGeoch
,
S. Owicki
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
1990
Corpus ID: 6139082
Competitive analysis is concerned with comparing the performance of on-line algorithms with that of an optimal off-line algorithm…
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