ffi cient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information " , by Bengt Holmström and Roger B

@inproceedings{Holmstrm2015ffiCA,
  title={ffi cient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information " , by Bengt Holmstr{\"o}m and Roger B},
  author={Bengt Holmstr{\"o}m and Roger B. Myerson},
  year={2015}
}
Both the normative and the positive uses of Pareto dominance become more complicated if the agents have private information that affect their utilities. Specifically, how can the consulting economist suggest a Pareto improvement if he does not fully know the preferences of the agents? And can the agents identify and agree to a Pareto improvement if they do not know each other’s preferences? In situations with incomplete information, the normative and the positive implications of Pareto… CONTINUE READING
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