• Corpus ID: 4232946

eVoting with the European Citizen Card

  title={eVoting with the European Citizen Card},
  author={Gisela Meister and Detlef H{\"u}hnlein and Jan Eichholz and Roberto Ara{\'u}jo},
As many European countries are about to introduce national ID cards, which are compliant to the European Citizen Card specification prCEN 15480 it is natural to study how those cards may be used to implement secure electronic voting schemes. For this purpose we introduce a modified variant of the electronic voting scheme introduced in [JCJ05] which may be used with European Citizen Cards. 

Figures and Tables from this paper

Privacy friendly applications using citizen cards based on cryptographic smartcards

Two solutions are proposed for this kind of services, benefiting from the already deployed citizen cards, reducing the cost of developing a new card, as well as maintain the card system.

Smart Cards in Electronic Voting: Lessons Learned from Applications in Legallybinding Elections and Approaches Proposed in Scientific Papers

It is outlined that the risk of a “forced-abstention” attack can be mitigated by using the restricted-ID mechanism as implemented in the German eID card, and it is shown that the restrictions in this mechanism serve as an interesting basis for the integration of eID cards in e-voting.

Preventing Board Flooding Attacks in Coercion-Resistant Electronic Voting Schemes

An adaption of the scheme in which each voter receives —in addition to the proper credential—some dummy credentials from the election registrars is presented, which guarantees an efficient linear-time tallying phase even in case of a massive board flooding attack with a very large number of invalid votes.

Leveraging the e-passport PKI to Achieve Interoperable Security for e-government Cross Border Services

The ability of the electronic passport PKI solution to extend and meet the demands of an interoperable cross border e-id solution is explored, as the requirements of such an authentication mechanism correlate to the characteristics of the deployed e-passport infrastructure.

E-Voting and Identify

This work demonstrates how it is possible to provide better trust distribution without platform side secrets by increasing the number of feedback messages back to the voter by using visual sharing of shape descriptions, which may be of independent interest.

Vote Casting in Any Preferred Constituency: A New Voting Channel

This work investigates if and how vote casting in any constituency can be constitutionally compliant, while maintaining the current electoral system and considers the integration of the new German electronic ID card for voter identification and authentication.

Privacy and verifiability in electronic voting

The taxonomy can be used to analyze the security of voting schemes by identifying the level of privacy and verifiability provided depending on the adversary capabilities assumed, and it allows to select appropriate levels of the requirements for different types of elections, and to determine reasonable adversary models for individual election scenarios.

MobilePACE - Password Authenticated Connection Establishment implementation on mobile devices

Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) ist eine Beschreibungssprache zur Definition of Datenstrukturen, die verwendeten bzw.



Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System

Experimental results give a quantitative evaluation of the tradeoffs between time, cost, and security in Civitas.

Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Schemes for Large Scale Elections

  • T. Okamoto
  • Computer Science
    Security Protocols Workshop
  • 1997
This paper proposes practical receipt-free voting schemes which are suitable for (nation wide) large scale elections, and proves that the proposed schemes satisfy receipt-freeness under such physical assumptions.

Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections with Observer

An electronic election scheme, that is coercion-resistant, a notion introduced by Juels et al. in [JCJ05], is introduced, that encrypts the credentials that serve as an authorisation to vote during registration and Pseudonymisation of the ciphertexts during the voting period implies a permanent secrecy of the submitted votes.

Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Scheme with a Tamper-Resistant Randomizer

A tamper-resistant randomizer (TRR), a secure hardware device such as smart card or Java card, replaces the role of third-party randomizer and untappable channel and K-out-of-L receipt-free voting is provided in more efficient manner by introducing divertible proof of difference.

Receipt-Freeness in Large-Scale Elections without Untappable Channels

This paper first considers the minimal requirements for receipt-free elections, without untappable communication channels between the voter and the voting authorities, and proposes a solution, which satisfies these requirements, based on an encryption blackbox, which uses its own randomness.

Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms

A technique based on public key cryptography is presented that allows an electronic mail system to hide who a participant communicates with as well as the content of the communication - in spite of

On Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections with Linear Work

This paper presents a coercion-resistant election scheme with a linear work factor based on the previous proposal of Juels et al., which exhibited a quadratic work factor, and employs Smith's idea to achieve a speedup to linear work.

A practical and secure coercion-resistant scheme for remote elections

This paper presents a new coercion-resistant election scheme with linear work factor that overcomes this and other flaws of the Smith proposal and is based on the group signature scheme of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (Crypto 2004).

E-Voting and Biometric Systems

  • S. Hof
  • Computer Science
    Electronic Voting in Europe
  • 2004
This paper evaluates biometric systems in order to prove their capabilities for e-Voting systems and finds them to be feasible for secure and feasible authentication.

Cryptography meets voting

We survey the contributions of the entire the- oretical computer science/cryptography community dur- ing 1975-2002 that impact the question of how to run ver- ifiable elections with secret ballots.