Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele

  title={Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele},
  author={John von Neumann},
  journal={Mathematische Annalen},
  • J. Neumann
  • Published 1 December 1928
  • Mathematics
  • Mathematische Annalen
Collusive Incentives in Markets with Differentiated Products
This paper proposes a generalized framework for the analysis of collusion in Bertrand oligopoly markets with possibly differentiated products and asymmetric cost structures. We first study how
Parallel evolutionary algorithms for optimization problems in aerospace engineering
The recent developments in hierarchical genetic algorithms (HGAs) to speed up the optimization of aerodynamic shapes are presented and a new class of multi-objective optimizers mixing HGAs and Nash Game Theory is de4ned.
A Game Semantics Foundation for Logic Programming (Extended Abstract)
This game semantics is based on an abstract reformulation of classical results about two player games, and allows a very simple characterization of the solution set of a logic program in terms of approximations of the value of the game associated to it, which can also be used to capture in a verysimple way the traditional “negation as failure” extensions.
Zero-Sum Games and Linear Programming Duality
The minimax theorem for zero-sum games is easily proved from the strong duality theorem of linear programming. For the converse direction, the standard proof by Dantzig (1951) is massively
Optimizing Type-I (α) and Type-II (β) Error Probabilities by Game-Theoretic Linear Programming for Sequential Sampling Plans in Quality Control
The article proposes an alternative technique compared to prematurely selecting the conventionally pre-specified type-I and type-II error probabilities, the cross-products of errors and non-errors model, to modify and improve the traditionally executed SSP’s final decisions.
The Strategy of Conflict and Cooperation
In this paper, I introduce (i) a novel and unified framework, called cooperative extensive form games , for the study of strategic competition and cooperation, which have been studied in specific
Strong coalitional equilibria in games under uncertainty
The Strong Coalitional Equilibrium (SCE) is introduced for normal form games under uncertainty. This concept is based on the synthesis of the notions of individual rationality, collective rationality
Maximin equilibrium
We introduce a new theory of games which extends von Neumann’s theory of zero-sum games to nonzero-sum games by incorporating common knowledge of individual and collective rationality of the players.
The Optimal Approximation Factor in Density Estimation
Two approaches are developed to achieve the optimal approximation factor of 2: an adaptive one and a static one that rely on estimating surrogate metrics to the total variation and exploit techniques from Adaptive Data Analysis.
Patrick Suppes and game theory
  • K. Binmore
  • Psychology
    Patrick Suppes, Economics, and Economic Methodology
  • 2018
This article is a contribution to a symposium celebrating the life of Patrick Suppes. It describes the context in which he made contributions relevant to two extremes of the game theory spectrum. At