You Share, I Share: Network Effects and Economic Incentives in P2P File-Sharing Systems

  title={You Share, I Share: Network Effects and Economic Incentives in P2P File-Sharing Systems},
  author={Mahyar Salek and Shahin Shayandeh and David Kempe},
We study the interaction between network effects and external incentives on file sharing behavior in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks. Many current or envisioned P2P networks reward individuals for sharing files, via financial incentives or social recognition. Peers weigh this reward against the cost of sharing incurred when others download the shared file. As a result, if other nearby nodes share files as well, the cost to an individual node decreases. Such positive network sharing effects can be… 
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