X-Phi and Carnapian Explication

  title={X-Phi and Carnapian Explication},
  author={Joshua Shepherd and James Justus},
  pages={381 - 402}
The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive… Expand
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Explication Defended
  • P. Maher
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Stud Logica
  • 2007
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