Worst-case equilibria

Abstract

In a system where noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model where several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open problems.

DOI: 10.1016/j.cosrev.2009.04.003

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Cite this paper

@article{Koutsoupias1999WorstcaseE, title={Worst-case equilibria}, author={Elias Koutsoupias and Christos H. Papadimitriou}, journal={Computer Science Review}, year={1999}, volume={3}, pages={65-69} }