Wittgenstein on following a rule

  title={Wittgenstein on following a rule},
  author={John Mcdowell},
We find it natural to think of meaning and understanding in, as it were, contractual terms. 2 Our idea is that to learn the meaning of a word is to acquire an understanding that obliges us subsequently if we have occasion to deploy the concept in question to judge and speak in certain determinate ways, on pain of failure to obey the dictates of the, meaning we have grasped; that we are 'committed to certain patterns of linguistic usage by the meanings we attach to expressions' (W, p. 21). 3… 

Meaning and rule following

How Meaning Might Be Normative

My aim here is (i) to outline an account what it is to grasp the meaning of a predicative term, and (ii) to draw on that account in an attempt to shed light on what the normativity of meaning might

“We Can Go No Further”: Meaning, Use, and the Limits of Language

  • William Child
  • Philosophy
    Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language
  • 2019
Is it possible to give a substantive, non-circular account of meaning and rule-following: an account that explains what it is for someone to use a word with a particular meaning, or to follow a

Wittgenstein, Social Views and Intransitive Learning.

Wittgenstein often refers to matters of learning, and there have been efforts to extract a social conception of learning from his writings. In the first half of this article, I look at three such

Wittgenstein on accord

The paper deals with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's views on the power of occurrent mental states to sort objects or states of affairs as in accord or in conflict with them, as presented in the

Pushing Wittgenstein and Quine Closer Together

As against the view represented here by Peter Hacker and John Canfield, I urge that the philosophies of Quine and Wittgenstein can be reconciled. Both replace the orthodox view of language as resting

Kripke's Account of the Rule‐Following Considerations

What determines the correctness criteria for linguistic behaviour? In an essay published some years ago 1 , Kripke ascribed to Wittgenstein a sceptical paradox leading to the conclusion that (alas!)

Wittgenstein and Analytic Revisionism

  • M. Gustafsson
  • Philosophy, Psychology
    Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning
  • 2019
Wittgenstein’s dictum, that philosophy “leaves everything as it is” (PI 124), suggests a stark contrast between his thought and what might be called revisionist varieties of analytic philosophy.

Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning

1. The past few years have seen a revival of interest in Kripke’s controversial reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks about rule-following. Thus, on the one hand, George Wilson has tried to defend

Wittgenstein (and his followers) on meaning and normativity

This paper questions the idea that Wittgenstein’s account of meaning as use requires an intrinsically normative understanding of this notion, and suggests instead that Wittgenstein is better