Within-Firm Pay Inequality

  title={Within-Firm Pay Inequality},
  author={Holger M. Mueller and Paige Parker Ouimet and Elena Simintzi},
  journal={Labor: Human Capital eJournal},
Financial regulators and investors alike have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. This study examines how within-firm pay inequality varies across firms, how it relates to firms’ operating performance and valuations, and whether it is priced by the market. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms in the UK, we find that pay disparities between top-level jobs – those where managerial skills and responsibility are most important – and bottom-level jobs are… 
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