With infinite utility, more needn't be better

@article{Hamkins2000WithIU,
  title={With infinite utility, more needn't be better},
  author={Joel David Hamkins and Barbara Gail Montero},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  year={2000},
  volume={78},
  pages={231 - 240}
}
How should a utilitarian act in an infinite world? Faced with the eternity of time, for example, how should he or she choose among actions whose consequences extend infinitely into the future? Similarly, in a world with infinitely many people, how should a utilitarian deliberate in the face of an infinite spectrum of utility values? The philosophical puzzle here is the very meaning of utilitarianism in such worlds; for in an infinite world it may not be possible to apply the utilitarian… 
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