Attacks in wireless sensor networks are Compromised-node and denial-of-service (DOS). In the Compromised-node attack (CN attack); an adversary physically compromises a subset of nodes to eavesdrop information, whereas in the denial-of-service attack, the adversary interferes with the normal operation of the network by actively disrupting, changing, or even paralyzing the functionality of a subset of nodes. These two attacks are similar in the sense that they both generate black holes areas within which the adversary can either passively intercept or actively block information delivery. Due to the unattended nature of WSNs, adversaries can easily produce such black holes. Severe CN and DOS attacks can disrupt normal data delivery between sensor nodes and the sink, or even partition the topology. In general we study routing mechanisms that circumvent (bypass) black holes formed by these attacks. We argue that existing multi-path routing approaches are vulnerable to such attacks, mainly due to their deterministic nature. So once an adversary acquires the routing algorithm, it can compute the same routes known to the source, and hence endanger all information sent over these routes. In our Proposal we develop mechanisms that generate randomized multi-path routes. Under our design, the routes taken by the "shares" of different packets change over time. So even if the routing algorithm becomes known to the adversary, the adversary still cannot pinpoint the routes traversed by each packet.