Winning with the Bomb

  title={Winning with the Bomb},
  author={Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={278 - 301}
Nuclear weapons' effects on an actor's success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how nuclear weapons change the perceived costs of conflict. The authors argue that states can improve their allotment of a good or convince an opponent to back down and have shorter crises if their opponents have greater expected costs of crisis. Noting that nuclear weapons increase the costs of full-escalation scenarios but decrease their probability, it is uncertain what impact nuclear weapons… 

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