Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents

  title={Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents},
  author={John M. Carland},
  journal={The Journal of Military History},
  pages={553 - 574}
  • John M. Carland
  • Published 31 March 2004
  • Political Science
  • The Journal of Military History
Together these late 1965 documents detail Westmoreland's theory of victory in Vietnam. The first one provides guidance to senior commanders about how he wanted them to fight the war and the second presents his evaluation of the troops' performance and recommendations for improvement. They show that he fully understood the need to provide security for the South Vietnamese so pacification and nation-building programs might succeed. Hence, they send an obvious but sometimes neglected message to… 
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