Winners and Losers under the Robinson-Patman Act

  title={Winners and Losers under the Robinson-Patman Act},
  author={Thomas W. Ross},
  journal={The Journal of Law and Economics},
  pages={243 - 271}
  • T. W. Ross
  • Published 1 October 1984
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Law and Economics
THE 1936 Robinson-Patman Amendments to the Clayton Antitrust Act prohibit differences in price that might be injurious to competition. They also restrict certain practices (for example, brokerage payments, unequal advertising allowances, etc.) that could be used to give hidden discounts to favored buyers. The Robinson-Patman (R-P) Act has the distinction of being almost universally unpopular among antitrust scholars.' This is probably because it looks less like an antitrust measure than like… 
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