Winner-weaken-loser-strengthen rule leads to optimally cooperative interdependent networks

  title={Winner-weaken-loser-strengthen rule leads to optimally cooperative interdependent networks},
  author={Lei Shi and Chen Shen and Yini Geng and Chen Chu and Haoran Meng and Matja{\vz} Perc and Stefano Boccaletti and Zhen Wang},
  journal={Nonlinear Dynamics},
We introduce a winner-weaken-loser-strengthen rule and study its effects on how cooperation evolves on interdependent networks. The new rule lowers the learning ability of a player if its payoff is larger than the average payoff of its neighbors, thus enhancing its chance to hold onto its current strategy. Conversely, when a player gaining less than the average payoff of its neighborhood, its learning ability is increased, thus weakening the player by increasing the chance of strategy change… 
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