Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests : Theory and experimental results

  title={Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests : Theory and experimental results},
  author={Roman M. Sheremeta and William A Masters and Timothy N. Cason},
This study provides a unified theoretical and experimental framework in which to compare three canonical types of competition: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are shared in proportion to performance. We introduce random noise to reflect imperfect information, and collect independent measures of risk aversion, other-regarding preferences, and… CONTINUE READING


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