Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games

@inproceedings{Fotakis2010WinnerImposingSM,
  title={Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games},
  author={Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2010}
}
We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents’ locations to a set of facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the nearest facility, and may misreport their location. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof, i.e., ensure that no agent can benefit from misreporting her location, do not resort… CONTINUE READING
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