• Corpus ID: 17692509

Winner Determination in Multi-Attribute Auctions

@inproceedings{Bichler2002WinnerDI,
  title={Winner Determination in Multi-Attribute Auctions},
  author={Martin Bichler and Jayant Kalagnanam},
  year={2002}
}
The theory of procurement auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity and quality is fixed prior to source selection. Multi-attribute reverse auctions allow negotiation over price and qualitative attributes such as color, weight, or delivery time. They promise higher market efficiency through a more effective information exchange of buyer’s preferences and supplier’s offerings. This paper focuses on a number of winner determination problems in multi-attribute auctions. Previous… 

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