Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from Ebay Auctions

@article{Bajari2000WinnersCR,
  title={Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from Ebay Auctions},
  author={Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortaçsu},
  journal={Experimental \& Empirical Studies eJournal},
  year={2000}
}
Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on eBay. Using our parameter estimates from this model, we measure the extent of the winner's curse and simulate seller revenue under… 
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