Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?

  title={Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?},
  author={Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine},
  journal={Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
  • J. Kennett, C. Fine
  • Published 1 February 2009
  • Psychology
  • Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral… 

The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment

  • Joshua May
  • Psychology, Philosophy
    Oxford Scholarship Online
  • 2018
This chapter argues that the best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions are not integral to moral judgment and, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these should not be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components.

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According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic ‘moral intuitions’. Private moral reasoning—when it occurs—is biased and

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

  • J. Haidt
  • Psychology
    Psychological review
  • 2001
The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached.

Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology.

Here are two of the biggest questions in moral psychology: (1) Where do moral beliefs and motivations come from? (2) How does moral judgment work? All other questions are easy, or at least easier,

The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology

  • J. Haidt
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • 2007
A fourth principle is proposed to guide future research: Morality is about more than harm and fairness, and more research is needed on the collective and religious parts of the moral domain, such as loyalty, authority, and spiritual purity.

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  • K. Jones
  • Philosophy
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
  • 2003
Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting

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