• DOI:10.2307/2538686
• Corpus ID: 154732192

Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe

@article{Mearsheimer1982WhyTS,
  title={Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe},
  author={John J. Mearsheimer},
  journal={International Security},
  year={1982},
  volume={7},
  pages={3 - 39}
}

• J. Mearsheimer
• Published 22 January 1982
• Political Science
• International Security

I I n light of the emergence of strategic parity and NATO’s manifest lack of enthusiasm for tactical nuclear weapons, the importance of the balance of conventional forces in Central Europe has increased significantly in the past decade.’ Regarding that balance, the conventional wisdom is clearly that the Warsaw Pact enjoys an overwhelming advantage. In the event of a conventional war, the Soviets are expected to launch a blitzkrieg that will lead to a quick and decisive victory. The implications of this specter of a hopelessly outgunned NATO are significant. Certainly, NATO’s behavior in a major crisis would be influenced by its view of the conventional balance. Furthermore, one’s perception of the conventional balance directly affects his or her view of the importance of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe. The New York Times, for example, endorsed the controversial neutron bomb as a means to counter NATO’s perceived inferiority at the conventional level.2 The fact of the matter is that the balance of conventional forces is nowhere near as unfavorable as it is so often portrayed to be. In fact, NATO’s prospects for thwarting a Soviet offensive are actually quite good.3 Certainly, NATO