Why probabilistic support is not inductive

  title={Why probabilistic support is not inductive},
  author={Karl Raimund Sir Popper and David W. Miller},
  journal={Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences},
  pages={569 - 591}
  • K. Popper, David W. Miller
  • Published 1987
  • Mathematics
  • Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences
This paper attempts to provide both an elaboration and a strengthening of the thesis of Popper & Miller (Nature, Lond. 302, 687f. (1983)) that probabilistic support is not inductive support. Although evidence may raise the probability of a hypothesis above the value it achieves on background knowledge alone, every such increase in probability has to be attributed entirely to the deductive connections that exist between the hypothesis and the evidence. We shall also do our best to answer all the… Expand
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