• Corpus ID: 18348996

Why majoritarian election methods should be Condorcet-efficient

@inproceedings{GreenArmytageWhyME,
  title={Why majoritarian election methods should be Condorcet-efficient},
  author={James Green-Armytage}
}
This paper introduces a new Condorcet-efficient voting method that uses ordinal information to determine the direction of pairwise defeats, and cardinal information to determine the strength of pairwise defeats. In this paper, I attempt to explain why Condorcet-efficient methods are desirable, identify the areas in which heretofore-proposed Condorcet-efficient methods could be improved, define the cardinal-weighted pairwise method, provide an example computation, discuss the rationale behind… 

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