Corpus ID: 208193817

Why dyads heed advice less than individuals do

@inproceedings{Schultze2019WhyDH,
  title={Why dyads heed advice less than individuals do},
  author={Thomas Schultze and Andreas Mojzisch and Stefan Schulz-Hardt},
  year={2019}
}
Following up on a recent debate, we examined advice taking in dyads compared to individuals in a set of three studies (total N = 303 dyads and 194 individuals). Our first aim was to test the replicability of an important previous finding, namely that dyads heed advice less than individuals because they feel more confident in the accuracy of their initial judgments. Second, we aimed to explain dyads’ behavior based on three premises: first, that dyads understand that the added value of an… Expand

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