Why does costly signalling evolve? Challenges with testing the handicap hypothesis

@article{Szmad2015WhyDC,
  title={Why does costly signalling evolve? Challenges with testing the handicap hypothesis},
  author={Szabolcs Sz{\'a}mad{\'o} and Dustin J. Penn},
  journal={Animal Behaviour},
  year={2015},
  volume={110},
  pages={e9-e12}
}
Zahavi's handicap hypothesis (Grafen, 1990; Zahavi, 1975; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) is a popular explanation for the evolution of honest and costly signalling. The general idea is that individuals honestly signal their quality because signalling is costly and therefore low-quality individuals cannot afford to produce dishonest signals. However, this hypothesis is controversial for several reasons. (1) Zahavi suggested that selection favours the evolution of honest signalling because (and not… CONTINUE READING