Why does coherence appear truth-conducive?

  title={Why does coherence appear truth-conducive?},
  author={Tomoji Shogenji},
This paper aims to reconcile (i) the intuitively plausible view that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable, and (ii) the negative results in Bayesian epistemology to the effect that there is no probabilistic measure of coherence such that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable. I consider a simple model in which the negative result appears in a… Expand
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Focused Correlation and Confirmation
  • G. Wheeler
  • Computer Science
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2009
This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. Expand
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Is coherence truth conducive
In recent papers Klein and Warfield (1994, 1996) argue that coherence per se is not truth conducive on the ground that the more coherent of two sets of beliefs is often more likely to contain a falseExpand
Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification
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A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support
  • Tomoji Shogenji
  • Mathematics
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2003
It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidenceExpand