Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

@article{Brandt2013WhyDB,
  title={Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?},
  author={Urs Steiner Brandt and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={2013},
  volume={157},
  pages={585-599}
}
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principal-supervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is larger than the expected value to the principal of… Expand

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