Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?

@article{Kesten2009WhyDP,
  title={Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?},
  author={Onur Kesten},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  year={2009},
  volume={144},
  pages={2209-2226}
}
  • Onur Kesten
  • Published 2009
  • Computer Science, Economics
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • We consider the problem of randomly assigning n indivisible objects to n agents. Recent research introduced a promising mechanism, the probabilistic serial that has superior efficiency properties than the most common real-life mechanism random priority. On the other hand, mechanisms based on Gale's celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature (with the exception of the present context) thanks to their outstanding efficiency features. We present an… CONTINUE READING

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