• DOI:10.1016/J.JFINECO.2010.01.003
Corpus ID: 14360767

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors

@article{Fahlenbrach2010WhyDF,
  title={Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors},
  author={Ruediger Fahlenbrach and A. Low and R. M. Stulz},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  year={2010},
  volume={97},
  pages={12-32}
}

Ruediger Fahlenbrach, A. Low, +1 author R. M. Stulz

Published 2010

Business

Journal of Financial Economics

Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance to their own firms. The first outside CEO director appointment has a higher stock-price reaction than… CONTINUE READING

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