Why do all the flights leave at 8 am?: Competition and departure-time differentiation in airline markets

  title={Why do all the flights leave at 8 am?: Competition and departure-time differentiation in airline markets},
  author={Severin Borenstein and Janet S. Netz},
  journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},

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