Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars

@article{Houle2016WhyCI,
  title={Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars},
  author={Christian Houle},
  journal={Journal of Peace Research},
  year={2016},
  volume={53},
  pages={680 - 695}
}
  • C. Houle
  • Published 27 July 2016
  • Political Science, Economics
  • Journal of Peace Research
Does class inequality increase the risk of civil war? I posit that inequality between social classes affects civil wars through two pathways: (1) it heightens the risk of political violence by fueling distributive conflicts; and (2) it reduces structural coup-proofing, which, in turn, increases the capacity of the military to fight insurgents. Combining these effects implies that the net effect of class inequality on civil war is ambiguous. Although class inequality increases the propensity for… 

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