• Corpus ID: 14164538

Why buy when you can rent ? Bribery attacks on Bitcoin consensus

  title={Why buy when you can rent ? Bribery attacks on Bitcoin consensus},
  author={Joseph Bonneau and Edward W. Felten and Steven Goldfeder and Joshua A. Kroll and Arvind Narayanan},
The Bitcoin cryptocurrency system relies on a novel distributed consensus mechanism relying on economic incentives. It is often argued that Bitcoin is “incentive-compatible” in simplified models; that is, that the scenario in which all miners follow the Bitcoin protocol is a stable Nash Equilibrium in which no miner has any incentive to defect. We introduce the notion of a bribery attack in which an attacker can purchase mining power (perhaps at a cost premium) for a short duration, using it to… 
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    2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)
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