Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism

  title={Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism},
  author={S. A. Crook and Cart Gillett},
  journal={Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={333 - 359}
Materialist metaphysicians want to side with physics, but not to take sides within physics. If we took literally the claim of a materialist that his position is simply belief in the claim that all is matter, as currently conceived, we would be faced with an insoluble mystery. For how would such a materialist know how to retrench when his favorite scientific hypotheses fail? How did the 18th century materialist know that gravity, or forces in general, were material? How did they know in the 19th… 
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