Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (And Ought to Be) Ignored by Scientists

  title={Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (And Ought to Be) Ignored by Scientists},
  author={Peter Achinstein},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={S180 - S192}
  • P. Achinstein
  • Published 1 September 2000
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation. 

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