• Corpus ID: 88521399

Why Condorcet Consistency is Essential

@article{Darlington2017WhyCC,
  title={Why Condorcet Consistency is Essential},
  author={Richard B. Darlington},
  journal={arXiv: Methodology},
  year={2017}
}
In a single winner election with several candidates and ranked choice or rating scale ballots, a Condorcet winner is one who wins all their two way races by majority rule or MR. A voting system has Condorcet consistency or CC if it names any Condorcet winner the winner. Many voting systems lack CC, but a three step line of reasoning is used here to show why it is necessary. In step 1 we show that we can dismiss all the electoral criteria which conflict with CC. In step 2 we point out that CC… 
1 Citations
An algorithmic approach to detect non-injectivity of the Partial Borda Count
TLDR
This project glances over the theory of Condorcet, Borda, Arrow, and Young, all of whom had a great impact on voting theory and social choice theory, and creates an algorithm that determines certain posets that go to the same score vectors for n-candidate elections (if n > 5).

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