Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?

@article{Rothkopf1990WhyAV,
  title={Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?},
  author={Michael H. Rothkopf and Thomas J. Teisberg and Edward Kahn},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1990},
  volume={98},
  pages={94 - 109}
}
In 1961, Vickrey showed that, in an independent private-values context with symmetric risk-neutral bidders, sealed second-price auctions have dominant truth-revealing equilibrium strategies, that they are perfectly efficient economically, and that they produce the same expected revenue for bid takers as equilibrium strategies in oral progressive auctions, Dutch auctions, or standard, first-price sealed bidding. Yet sealed second-price auctions seldom occur. We argue that fear of cheating and… Expand
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