Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants Are Not Predatory: And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power

@article{Elhauge2003WhyAP,
  title={Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants Are Not Predatory: And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power},
  author={E. Elhauge},
  journal={Yale Law Journal},
  year={2003},
  volume={112},
  pages={681}
}
  • E. Elhauge
  • Published 2003
  • Economics
  • Yale Law Journal
    • t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for funding by Harvard Law School, the Handler Foundation, and the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business at Harvard Law School. I have also benefited from comments on earlier drafts by Jonathan Baker, William Baumol, Lucian Bebchuk, Joe Brodley, Allen Ferrell, Bruce Hay, Howell Jackson, Louis Kaplow, Benjamin Klein, Al Klevorick, Michael Levine, Janus Ordover, Mark Ramseyer, Mark Roe, Hal Scott, Matt Stephenson, Bill Stuntz… CONTINUE READING
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    48 Citations
    Highly Influential Citations
    4
    Background Citations
    11
    Methods Citations
    1

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        The monopolist price will reflect a markup over cost that depends on demand elasticity