Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’

  title={Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’},
  author={Neal Judisch},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • Neal Judisch
  • Published 1 September 2008
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not… 
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