Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election

@article{FonsecaGalvis2019WhoWT,
  title={Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election},
  author={{\'A}ngela Fonseca Galvis and Chiara Superti},
  journal={Democratization},
  year={2019},
  volume={26},
  pages={1278 - 1298}
}
ABSTRACT What explains the variation in vote shares received by candidates in single-party authoritarian elections where everybody wins? The scholarly literature has often ignored institutional variations, treated all authoritarian elections as similar, and explained the variation of vote shares as a consequence of clientelism, coercion or electoral fraud. We employ a unique data set for Cuba’s 2013 National Assembly election to show an alternative answer: even in authoritarian regimes… 
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