Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon

Abstract

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilbirum than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game, by running both one-shot and repeated markets. Whereas in the one-shot markets… (More)
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.007

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@article{Mller2013WhoAM, title={Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon}, author={Wieland M{\"u}ller and Fangfang Tan}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, year={2013}, volume={82}, pages={658-674} }