Who Votes More Strategically?

@article{Eggers2020WhoVM,
  title={Who Votes More Strategically?},
  author={Andrew C. Eggers and Nick Vivyan},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2020},
  volume={114},
  pages={470 - 485}
}
Strategic voting is an important explanation for aggregate political phenomena, but we know little about how strategic voting varies across types of voters. Are richer voters more strategic than poorer voters? Does strategic behavior vary with age, education, gender, or political leaning? The answers may be important for assessing how well an electoral system represents different preferences in society. We introduce a new approach to measuring and comparing strategic voting across voters that… 
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