• Corpus ID: 15275256

Who Volunteers ? A Theory of Firms where Agents are Motivated to Work

@inproceedings{Gth2003WhoV,
  title={Who Volunteers ? A Theory of Firms where Agents are Motivated to Work},
  author={Werner G{\"u}th and Ernst Maug},
  year={2003}
}
While effort averse agents provide only minimum effort if not monitored, other agents may be committed to the organizational goal. Our study allows for a continuum of types, representing different degrees of intrinsic work motivation. This results in two different organizational forms, “volunteer organizations” and “companies,” which may also attract less committed employees who require output-dependent incentive contracts to elicit effort. Generally, only organizations with significant… 

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